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I develop a theory of technical progress that uncovers suﬃcient conditions for oppo-
sition to the adoption of child labor laws to disappear over time. The supply of child
labor comes exclusively from unskilled parents, because of their inability to help their
children beneﬁt from formal education, while its demand originates from capitalists—
the ﬁrms’ owners. Because child labor crowds out adult employment, there are always
social pressures to ban it. However, such pressures are met by capitalists’ opposition.
Capitalists oppose the adoption of a ban on child labor because such a ban reduces
opportunities for earning a high return on capital. Technical progress, induced by
skill accumulation, improves the earning prospects of ﬁrms hiring adult workers only,
while it reduces those of ﬁrms hiring children only. As a result, more capitalists are
drawn into the adult labor market, and industrial opposition to a ban on child labor
eventually vanishes over time. Provided child labor exhibits skill-enhancing learning-
by-doing, policy action to speed up the emergence of child labor laws should therefore
focus on education reforms that raise the quality of education school-goers receive,
and on political reforms that raise the cost of lobbying legislators against adopting
a ban on child labor. However, in countries where child labor provides little or no
opportunities for learning-by-doing, no law will emerge unless appropriately targeted
poverty alleviation mechanisms are designed, in order to induce unskilled parents to
allocate a positive fraction of child’s time to schooling.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D31, I21, J22 O12.
1Key words: Child labor, learning-by-doing, education, technical progress, lob-
bying cost, voting equilibrium.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
Until a little more than 150 years ago, child labor was a common practice in most
countries, including the United States and Great Britain. Today, these countries,
along with many other developed countries have successfully enforced laws banning
or restricting child labor. A simple explanation for the adoption and enforcement of
these laws is based upon the general perception that child labor hinders children’s
education which many believe is in the best interest not only of children’s own lives,
but also of the society as a whole, in terms of the quality of its future labor force.
While this is understood, opposition to child labor, however, is yet to become the
norm in many developing countries. According to the World Bank, many developing
countries still report high incidences of child labor, suggesting that tolerance of this
phenomenon is still prevalent in these countries. In reaction to this evidence, the
international community led by rich countries has demanded the immediate abolition
of the practice of child labor in developing. ILO convention 138 and 182 and the
United Nation Convention on the Right of Children are a few illustrations of the
intolerance of the international community, which urges immediate legislative reforms
in developing countries to deal with child labor.
Yet, a number of historical accounts based upon the experiences of the nineteenth
century United States and Great Britain, have revealed that even in the case of
child labor, social reform legislation, instead of preceding and precipitating social
change, actually followed and was a response to social change (Carolyn Moehling
11999). Citing these historical accounts, Moehling maintains that the decline of child
labor in the United States was not primarily due to the eﬀectiveness of state child
labor laws but rather to factors that reduced the importance of child labor to both
industry and families. Technical progress is one such factor. But technical progress
itself is endogenous. Why did some countries experienced technical progress that
led eventually to the elimination of child labor, while others are yet to follow suit?
This question is crucial to consider for the following reasons: on one hand, education,
through the skills it imparts, is viewed as a source of technical progress; but, on the
other hand, child labor and schooling are competing claims on child’s time, which
implies that sending a child to work rather to school, can have consequences not only
on the child’s own life, but also on the society as a whole, in terms of the quality
of the future labor force. Moreover, in many countries, poverty is still forcing many
p a r e n t st op r e f e rw o r ko v e rs c h o o l i n ga st h e i ro ﬀspring’s childhood occupation. How
can these countries experience the type of technical progress that will eventually lead
to the emergence of laws banning child labor?
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between endogenous
technical progress and the decline of the opposition to child labor laws. We use
a dynamic heterogeneous-agents general equilibrium model that features a labor-
market-based explanation for the incentive to restrict children participation in the
labor market. We use this model to study the dynamics of industrial opposition to
child labor laws in an environment where formal education and on-the-job learning-
2by-doing are two potential sources of skill acquisition. We argue that only in an
economy where learning-by-doing and formal education are two alternative engine of
skill acquisition can opposition to the adoption of child labor laws decline over time.
2 Some Stylized Facts
In this section, we discuss empirical evidence for three key assumptions of the model
we use in this paper. Two of these assumptions are captured by the aggregate pro-
duction function postulated in this paper, while the other is a feature of the state
transition matrix characterizing intergenerational social mobility.
A. Sources of Opposition to Child Labor Laws
It is well-understood that pressure for the elimination of child labor can have either
a domestic source or a foreign source. Domestically, in many countries including the
nineteenth century US, social movements of various origins have emerged in defense
of children’s rights (Moehling 1999). In the international arena, several international
organizations (the International Labor Organization and the World Trade Organiza-
tion are examples) have joined hands to combat child labor, often with the support of
rich countries. But not much attention is given to the rise and fall of the opposition
to child labor laws. Available evidence reveal that in the United States and Great
Britain, for example, child labor was an important component of the manufacturing
workforce in the ﬁrst half of the 19th century. Moehling (1999) maintains that in
the 19th century US, legislative eﬀorts that sought to prohibit the employment of
3children in certain manufacturing activities met the resistance of manufacturers who
saw in the use of child labor a means to cut down on costs, by replacing more costly
adult workers with children. Goldin and Sokoloﬀ (1982) estimate that in 1820, a time
where industrial opposition to child labor legislation was particularly high, children
accounted for over 20% of manufacturing employment in the Northeast of the US.
However, as Moehling observes, legislative progress in the US only came in the last
few decades of the 19th century after the share of children in national manufacturing
employment had fallen below 7%. These facts suggest that the decline of manufac-
turing interests that blocked and weakened States legislative proposals to eliminate
child labor in fact only mirrored the decline in the relative share of children employed
in industries. In this paper, we draw on this evidence and endogenize the demand for
child labor. In our paper, this demand comes from capitalists who must choose the
market in which to hire labor for production. There are two labor market: a market
for adult labor which is perfectly competitive and a market for child labor which
exhibits some monopsonistic market power. The latter feature echos the documented
evidence that children workers are often exploited in the sense that they are paid less
than the value of their marginal product. Supporting this idea of cheap child labor
is the evidence that children employed in the Indian hand-knotted carpet industry
in general were paid about half of the adult wage, even when they had the same
productivity (Deborah Levison et al. 1998). Anecdotal evidence also exists.
B. Substitutability between Adult Labor and Child Labor
4To capture the feature that child labor crowds out adult employment, child labor
and adult labor are modeled as being substitutable. Note that ours is not the ﬁrst
study to assume the substitutability between adult and child labor. Basu and Van
(1998) make a similar assumption. Opponent of this view have put forward a num-
ber of arguments. The most remarkable one is perhaps the so-called “nimble-ﬁnger”
argument. According to this argument, children and adults diﬀer in work charac-
teristics which lead to market segmentation. However, Levison et al. (1998) reject
this “nimble ﬁnger” argument based upon a case study of the hand-knotted carpet
industry in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. They argue that child labor was not
really necessary in the Indian carpet industry, and that its existence only succeeded
in creating high levels of adult unemployment and/or under-employment. They also
conclude, based upon that case study, that developing countries’s tolerance of child
labor could only come at the expense of adult jobs.
C. Education and Learning-by-Doing as Sources of Skill Acquisition
A distinguishing feature of our model is that both education and child labor are
potential sources of skill-acquisition. There is a signiﬁcant number of studies that
formalize education as a mechanism of skill accumulation. Lucas (1988) and Kremer
and Chen (2000) are only a few examples. According to the World Bank, countries
with the highest levels of average educational attainment are also the richest (see for
example World Development Report 2002), thus providing evidence of the key role
played by education as a mechanism skill acquisition.
5In contrast, evidence that child labor entails learning-by-doing is somewhat mixed
in the existing literature. Some empirical studies (for example, Galbi 1997) lend sup-
port to this assumption.1 Others, in contrast, reject the learning-by-doing hypothesis
based upon the view that working children in developing countries are usually involved
in hazardous labor activities such as drug-dealing, street-begging, child prostitution
and pornography which provide virtually no basis for learning valuable productive
skills (see for example Lim 1998). What this literature really suggests is that not
all forms of child labor entail learning-by-doing. While one cannot imagine child
prostitution or pornography as an activity that teaches valuable skills to children,
nor can one hope to see such skills acquired by a child involved in street-begging or
drug-dealings, it is generally accepted that, in the case of manufactory employment,
child labor, if done under appropriate conditions, can help a child acquire valuable
experience in the operation of modern industrial technology. The case of the indus-
trial revolution in England (Galbi 1997) and that of the nineteenth century United
States (Goldin and Sokoloﬀ 1982) oﬀer support for this theory.2
1Galbi (1997) reveals that in the beginning of the industrial revolution in Britain, children were
preferred to adults for manufacturing employment. However, as early cohorts of children laborers
gained more experience in the use of modern technology and became skilled adults, this led to a
decline, over time, in the use of child labor in that industry.
2Goldin and Sokoloﬀ (1982) reveal that in the United States, child labor was an important com-
ponent of the manufacturing workforce in the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century. They estimated
that children accounted for over 20% of manufacturing employment in the Northeast in 1820.
63 Literature Review
Recent theories of child labor in the literature include Glomm (1997), Dessy (2000),
and Ranjan (2001) but these models do not imply a theory of the emergence of child-
labor laws. Other approaches to analyzing child labor however could also yield a
theory of child-labor laws. For instance Basu and Van (1998), rely on the hypothesis of
multiple equilibria in the market for unskilled labor to explain why in some countries
banning child-labor could be welfare-enhancing. To the extent that child labor and
adult labor are substitutes, child labor laws may increase eﬃciency, by averting a
poverty-inducing crowding out of adult employment. However if the economy is too
poor, there may not be such a role for child labor laws. As their model is static,
it does not lend itself to analysis of the emergence of child labor laws over time,
for an initially poor economy. This is also a diﬃculty in other theoretical model
including Baland and Robinson (2000), Dessy and Pallage (2001) and Dessy and
Vencatachellum (2003).
More closely related to our paper are works by Dirk Krueger and Jessica Tjornhom
(2001) and Matthias Doepke and Fabrizio Zilibotti (2002). Krueger and Tjornhom
(2001) use a quantitative model to assess the welfare eﬀect of child labor/education
laws on diﬀerent groups of the population in an environment where there are human
capital externalities in the production process. In their models, even the poorest
parents beneﬁt from compulsory education, which seems to suggest that even poor
countries can beneﬁt from this legislation. Their model therefore cannot explain
7opposition to education/child labor laws in poor countries.
Doepke and Zilibotti (2003) develop a theory of child labor restrictions (CLR)
that emphasizes endogenous fertility, and parental investment in education. In their
model, poorer parents with few children have little to gain from child labor and are
therefore likely to favor CLR, while poorer parents with many working children would
be expected to oppose CLR. Perhaps because of its focus on endogenous fertility
and inequality, their model leaves the demand for child labor unexplained. In order
to account for the emergence of child labor laws, our paper endogenizes both the
supply and the demand for child labor drawing on the documented evidence about
the positive association between the decline of opposition to child labor laws and the
decline in the share of children employment in industry.
4 The Model
Consider an overlapping-generations economy where economic activity extends over
an inﬁnite discrete time. Each generation of individuals lives for two periods: ﬁrst as
a child who makes no decision, then as a decisionmaking adult parent. For simplicity,
each household consists of one parent and his child, and each generation of individuals
has a unit measure so that there is no population growth. In every period, the econ-
omy produces a single homogenous good which we take as the numeraire. The good
is produced using physical capital and labor in eﬃciency units. At the beginning of
every period, a number ¯ k of childless, one period-lived capitalists is born. Each cap-
8italist is endowed with one unit of capital. There is no physical capital accumulation
and capital, for simplicity, completely depreciates after its use, so that in each period,
¯ k is also the time-invariant, economy-wide stock of capital. This is just a simplifying
assumption.
Adult workers diﬀer in their skill status (skilled or unskilled), which depends upon
whether they acquired valuable productive skills when young. Skill acquisition has
two potential sources: schooling and child labor. Each child is endowed with one unit
of time. If no child labor law is passed in the beginning of the period, child time will
have two competing claims: work and formal schooling. In that case, the income of
a household is the sum of parental income, ωa
i, which depends upon his skill status i
(i = s,u), and the income from child labor (1 − ei)ωc,w h e r e ei denotes child time
allocated to schooling for a child whose parent has skill status i,a n dωc is the child
labor wage.
Upon entering adulthood in the second period, each worker learns his skill re-
alization. The transition probability for a child whose parent has skill status i,i s
described by πij =P r ( j | i,ei),w h e r eπij denotes the probability that a child whose
parent is in a state characterized by a skill status i transits to a state characterized
by a skill status j, when adult. For simplicity, we specialize the 2 × 2 probability
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9where λi ∈ [0,1] denotes a measure of the productivity of education as a skill-
imparting mechanism for a child whose parent has skill status i;a n dδ ∈ [0,1] denotes
the productivity of on-the-job learning-by-doing as a skill imparting mechanism.
A. Preferences and Budget Constraints
Parents have identical preferences, and are expected utility maximizers, who de-
rive utility from consumption of the numeraire good (C) and from raising a child who
transits to a skill status j, when adult. The expected utility of a parent with skill
status i (i = s,u)i st h u sg i v e nb y :





,ρ ∈ (0,1) (1)
where ρ denotes the intergenerational discount factor, ωa
j denotes the labor income
of a child who transits to a state characterized by a skill status j when adult, and E
is an expectation operator conditional on current period information.
The budget constraint faced by each parent is given by:
Ci ≤ ωa
i +( 1− e)ωc (2)
where ωa
i denotes the labor income of an adult worker with skill status i,a n dωc
denotes the child labor wage.
B. Production and Wages
For simplicity, assume it takes one unit of capital to start a ﬁrm. Firms are
owned by capitalists who are residual claimants. In each period, capitalists must
10decide in which market to hire labor. There are two types of markets: a market
for adult labor (market a) and a market for child labor (market c). The ﬁrst is
perfectly competitive, with ﬁrm hiring skilled and/or unskilled adult labor at market
determined wages, while the second exhibits monopsonistic market power. A possible
explanation for the monopsonistic market power in the child labor market is that
children’s labor contract are mostly informal in nature and that children are more
readily exploitable due to their immature age.
The technology chosen by the ﬁrm determines the market in wich it will hire







φ(ηs) > 1 denotes a skill-biased labor-augmenting technical progress, ηs denotes the
proportion of skilled workers in the labor force. It will be assumed that the function
φ satisﬁes φ0 > 0. Perfect competition in the adult labor market implies that each
adult is paid the value of his marginal product: ωa
s = γφ(ηs)H
γ−1









denotes the number of ﬁrms (or capitalists) hiring adult labor.
Since all adults inelastically supply their unit endowment of time, market clearing
implies la
s =( ka)
−1 ηs and la
u =( ka)
−1 ηu,w h e r eηi denotes the proportion of adult
11workers with skill status i = s,u,w i t hηs + ηu =1 . Furthermore, since ka + kc = ¯ k,
where kc denotes the number of capitalists hiring child labor, the market-clearing
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. (4)
Clearly, as long as φ(ηs) > 1, there is a productivity premium for skills. Furthermore,
given the above structure of adult wages, an increase in the number of capitalists
hiring child labor tends to cause both types of adult labor wages to fall. This negative
relationship captures the feature that child labor crowds out adult labor, at least in
an economy-wide sense. This feature of the model is supported by empirical evidence
(e.g. Levison et al. 1998 and Moehling 1999).
Next, in the market for child labor, it will be assumed that each capitalist (or ﬁrm)
is matched with lc children for production of the homogenous good. The matching
generates a surplus A(ηs)lc,w h e r eA0 < 0, implying that the surplus from the match
decreases with the level of technical progress in the adult sector. This surplus is
shared between the capitalist and the children workers according to an exogenously
determined rule, α,w h e r eα ∈ (0,1) is interpreted as the fraction of the surplus that
goes to children workers. Assuming that children are homogenous in labor market
characteristics, and given that each capitalist employes lc children, equal surplus
12sharing between children workers implies that each child earns
ωc = αA(ηs). (5)
The capitalist’s share of the surplus is given by (1 − α)A(ηs)lc.T h es m a l l e rα,t h e
higher the level of child exploitation in this economy. Since there are kc ﬁrms hiring
children, and nc is the total number of children workers, clearly ﬁrms’ homogeneity






C. Parental Allocation of Child Time
For simplicity, assume child time allocated to schooling, ei, is a binary variable
which takes values in the set {0,1}. Therefore, each parent’s problem is to decide on
child’s time allocation between schooling and work, so as to maximize his expected
life-time utility. Let V (i,eit,ηst,k ct) denotes the value of being a generation t parent
with skill status i who makes the child time allocation decision eit:f o rt =0 ,1,...




























t = αA(ηst). For a parent who chooses to send his child to school, it must
be that
V (i,1,ηst,k ct) ≥ V (i,0,ηst,k ct),
otherwise the household will be better oﬀ with the child working full time. The
followoing assumption will prove useful the rest of the analysis:
A.1 The skill acquisition mechanism satisﬁes: δ = λu <λ s.
This assumption, made for simplicity, implies that for a child whose parent is
unskilled, schooling and work are equally productive as skill-imparting mechanisms,
while for a child whose parent is skilled, schooling is always more productive than on-
the-job learning-by-doing. This assumption can be justiﬁed, for example, by the fact
that educated adults are more able to create a better learning environment for their
school-age children than can their uneducated counterparts. A similar assumption is
made by Kremer and Chen (2000). Hence the following result.
Proposition 1 Let assumption A.1 hold. Then in absence of a law banning child
labor, children with unskilled (respectively skilled) parents will always work (attend
school) instead of attending school (working).
Proof. Deﬁne 4i ≡ V (i,0,ηst,k ct)−V (i,1,ηst,k ct).I ts u ﬃces to show that 4u > 0
and 4s < 0. First, using (7) and (8), it follows that
4u =l n[ wu (ηst,k ct)+ωc
t] − ln[wu (ηst,k ct)] > 0
14for all ωc
t > 0. Hence the optimality of the unskilled parent’s decision to send his
child to work.
Second, consider the diﬀerence 4s = V (s,0,ηst,k ct) − V (s,1,ηst,k ct). Using (3)














Since the maximum income level a working child can contribute to the household is
¯ ωc = αA(0), clearly one can always choose α, λs and δ, such that 4s < 0. Hence the
result
Because unskilled parents are unable to pr o v i d et h e i rc h i l d r e nw i t ha na d e q u a t e
learning environment at home, they derive, as result, a smaller gain from their child’s
education (λu = δ). For these parents, to the extent that child labor exhibits skill-
enhancing learning-by-doing, sending the child to work is always an optimal decision.
For educated parents, in contrast, their ability to provide a better learning environ-
ment for their children allow them to beneﬁt greatly from sending their children to
school. As a result, it is always optimal for them to choose schooling over work as
their children’s childhood occupation. For the purpose of the analysis to be carried
here, an interesting question is which category of parents beneﬁt from supporting a
ban on child labor. We will establish further below that, since child labor crowds out
adult employment, by biding capitalists away, at least one of the two groups of adult
workers has a vested interest in ending child labor.
Proposition 1 implies that eut =0and est =1for all t (t =0 ,1,....). Therefore,










Since there is no population growth, we can characterize the law of motion of the































with ηst + ηut =1all t.
Another implication of proposition 1 is that since each parent has one child, in all
periods t, the total proportion of children who will supply child labor is equal to the
proportion of unskilled parents: nct = ηut.
D. The Capitalist’s Problem
When there are political pressures to ban child labor, capitalists may have an
incentive to block such pressures by lobbying legislators against adopting such a ban.
In the beginning of each period, the sequence of events is as follows. Unless a law
banning child labor has already been adopted (the law is irreversible), in the beginning
of the period a legislative proposal to ban child labor is put forward for adoption
(possibly by a group of adult workers who gain from such a ban). Then before they
each choose the market in which to hire labor, capitalists ﬁrst collectively decide
whether or not to block the legislative proposal to ban child labor. In the aﬃrmative
they will each incur a per capita cost, θ, necessary to eﬀectively block the proposal.
16The legislative proposal can only be block one period at a time. If capitalists vote
to block the proposal, they will each choose between two hiring strategies, so as to
maximize the return to capital. If, instead, they decide against blocking the legislative
proposal, it will become a law from that period on, in which case capitalists would
have no choice but to hire adult workers only.
I assume that capitalists cast their vote on whether or not to block the legislative
proposal banning child labor by anticipating the eﬀect their vote will have on the
return to capital. Hence they solve their problem by backward induction. First, they
each compute the return to capital for two diﬀerent scenarios. In the ﬁrst, they have
each two hiring options: either children only or adults only. In the second, they
are restricted by law to hire only adult labor. They cast their vote by comparing
the return to capital under these two alternative scenarios. Therefore, I characterize
below the retrun to capital under these two alternative scenarios.
First, assuming that no law is passed, let rm denotes the net return to capital for
the hiring strategy m ∈ {a,c}. A capitalist who plays the hiring startegy m = a will
hire adult labor only, while one who plays the strategy m = c will hire children only.
Using (3) and (4) as well as resource constraints, I characterize the return to capital
















− θ. for m = c
, (10)
where ηs denotes the proportion of skilled adult workers in the economy. Each capi-
17talist chooses the market in which to hire labor so as to solve the following problem:
max{ra (ηs,k c,θ),r c (ηs,k c,θ)}.
Since all capitalists are identical, more capitalists will continue to move from the adult
labor market into the child labor market until returns to capital are equalized between
the two hiring strategies. In absence of a law restricting child labor, I therefore deﬁne
a market equilibrium as a situation in which all capitalists are indiﬀerent as to the
m a r k e ti nw h i c ht h e yh i r el a b o r :
ra (ηs,k c,θ)=rc (ηs,k c,θ). (11)
If the conditions underlying the Implicit function theorem can be shown to hold,
then in equilibrium, the distribution of capitalists between the two markets is entirely
determined by the economy-wide proportion, ηs, of skilled adult workers: k∗
c = κ(ηs).
We are interested in the properties of the function κ deﬁned by the equation (11).





such that for all ηs ∈ [0,1], k∗
c = κ(ηs) and κ0 < 0.
Proof. The proof follows from the Implicit function theorem
The above result is quite intuitive since a rise in the proportion of skilled adult
workers raises total factor productivity in ﬁrms using adult labor. This, in turn,
attracts more capitalists in the adult labor market, thus pooling them away from the
child labor market, as they seek to earn the highest possible return on their capital.
18Given the above result, the optimal level for the return to capital when capitalists
can choose between two hiring options is given by
¯ r(ηs,θ)=ra [ηs,κ(ηs),θ]=rc [ηs,κ(ηs),θ]. (12)
Next, suppose, instead, that a law banning child labor is adopted, so that hiring
children is no longer an option. In that case, kc =0and ka = ¯ k, so that the return
to capital is given by






Given the pair (ηs,θ),i f¯ r(ηs,θ) > e ra (ηs), capitalists will block the proposal, other-
wise it will become a law banning child labor from then on.
5 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, I deﬁne and characterize both a sequential market equilibrium and a
voting equilibrium for this economy. In particular, I characterize both the time path
for the economy-wide distribution of adult labor by skill status and the distribution
of capitalists between markets.
Deﬁnition 1(A Sequential market Equilibrium). An intertemporal equi-
librium for this economy is a sequence of economy-wide distributions of capitalists
{k∗
ct}t=0,1,...., and a sequence of economy-wide distribution of adult workers by skill
status {η∗
t}t=0,1,.... such that at each date t and given (k∗
ct,η∗
t,x t),
19(i) the law of motion of the economy-wide distribution of adult workers by skill
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st)] − rc [η∗
st,κ(η∗
st)] ≡ 0, (15)
where k∗
at = ¯ k − κ(η∗
st),a n dk∗
at denotes the equilibrium number of capitalists who
employ adults only at time t.
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Deﬁnition 3 (Steady State Equilibirum) A steady state equilibrium is an







Conditions (i) of equilibrium combined with the constraint ηst + ηut =1 ,i m p l i e s
20that the law of motion of the economy-wide proportion of skilled labor is given by:
ηst+1 =( λs − δ)ηst + δ. (16)
Two important observations can be made from the structure of this law of motion.
First, since unskilled parents pref e rw o r ko v e rs c h o o l i n ga st h e i ro ﬀspring’s childhood
occupation, unless child labor exhibits skill-enhancing learning-by-doing (i.e., δ>0),
there is no steady equilibrium with a positive proportion of skilled workers. Second,
since (λs − δ) ∈ (0,1),c l e a r l y ,a sl o n ga sδ>0, the system’s dynamics characterized
by (16) converges monotonically to a steady state with a positive proportion of skilled
workers. Hence the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Let assumption A.1 hold. If child labor exhibits skill-enhancing learning-
by-doing (δ>0), then there exists a steady state equilibrium with a positive propor-
tion, η∗
s, of skilled adult workers.





1 − λs + δ
. (17)
Clearly, only if δ =0will η∗
s =0be the unique steady state, since 1 − λs > 0
Proposition 3 implies that in countries where labor performed by children does
not provides opportunities for learning-by-doing, if a signiﬁcant proportion of children
work instead of attending school, clearly such an economy will eventually fall into a
21poverty trap with no skilled labor. As long as δ>0, for economies that begin with
intially a very low proportion of skilled workers, convergence to the unique steady
with a positive proportion of skilled workers will be from below.
A. Who Gains from Banning Child Labor?
Recall that in this environment, work and schooling are the only competing claims
on child time. In addition, there are no direct costs for education, in the sense
that school attendance is free. In such an environment, a ban on child labor and a
compulsory education law coincide, for if a child is not in school, it must be that he
works, and vice versa. Let e V (i,ηst) denotes the equilibrium value of being a parent
with skill status i when a ban on child labor is enforced. Using (3) and (4), it follows
that














for all i (i = s,u).
Now, let ¯ V (i,ηst) be the equilibrium value for being a parent with skill status i
22when there is no law banning child labor. Using (7) and (8), it follows that


































Let µit denotes the net gain from supporting a ban on child labor:
µit = e V (i,ηst) − ¯ V (i,ηst).
Proposition 4 Let assumption A.1 hold. Then, skilled adult workers always gain
from a ban on child labor, while unskilled adult workers may or may not beneﬁtf r o m
supporting the ban.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that µst > 0 while the sign of µut is indeterminate.
Proposition 4 implies that social pressures to end child labor will come at least
from one group of adult workers. This justiﬁes our earlier assumption that in every
period, unless a law banning child labor is already adopted, there always will be social
pressures to end this practice.
B. The Emergence of Child Labor Laws
In this subsection, we formalize the emergence of laws banning child labor, when
opposition to such laws is organized by ﬁrms. Recall that in the period in which the
23law banning child labor is adopted, it must be that ¯ r(η∗
st,θ) > e ra (η∗
st). Therefore,
to understand the emergence over time of laws banning child labor, it is important
to determine suﬃcient conditions for the above inequality to hold. Since, for an
economy with initially too low a proportion of skilled individuals, convergence is
toward a higher proportion, for simplicity, I restrict attention to the case where
no law is adopted during the economy’s transition to the steady state. Given this
assumption, I address the following question: under what conditions will the law
banning child labor emerge in the steady state? The answer to this question is
obtained by computing the diﬀerence D = e ra (η∗
s) − ¯ r(η∗
s,θ). A law will not emerge
in the steady state, unless σ>0.
Using (10), (14), (13), and (17), and setting ¯ k =1 ,
D = θ − (1 − γ)




[1 − (1 − κ[ψ (λs,δ)])
γ].
The above equation suggests three main determinants of the emergence of child labor
laws namely, the productivity of child labor as a mechanism of skill acquisition (δ),
the productivity of education as a skill-imparting mechanism (λs), and the cost of
lobbying (θ).S i n c eψδ > 0, ψλ > 0,a n dφ0 > 0, it can be established that Dδ > 0,
Dλ > 0, Dθ > 0,w h e r eDj denotes the partial deirivative of D with respect to j
(j = δ,λ,θ). I have just established the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Let assumption A.1 hold. Then, countries in which a signiﬁcant
proportion of working children acquire productivie skills on the job (i.e. δ>0) will
24eventually eliminate child labor if (i) a suﬃciently high proportion of school-goers
acquire productive skills through schooling, and/or (ii) the cost of lobbying legislators
against banning child labor is suﬃciently high.
The above proposition suggests that, provided child labor exhibits learning-by-
doing, policy action to eliminate it has essentially two dimensions: an education re-
forms dimension and a political reforms dimension. On one hand, education reforms
should aim at improving the productivity of education as a skill-enhancing mecha-
nism. Policy reforms, on the other hand, should aim at raising the cost of lobbying
legislators against adopting laws banning child labor. However, in countries where
child labor provides little or no opportunities for learning-by-doing, appropriately
targeted poverty alleviation mechanisms may need to be designed in order to induce
unskilled parents to allocate a positive fraction of child’s time to schooling.
6 Concluding Remarks
My purpose in this paper has been to reconcile the historical evidence on the emer-
gence of laws banning child labor with the ongoing debate on policy response to child
labor. I developed a positive theory of the emergence of child labor laws, in an en-
vironment where social pressures to eliminate child labor come from adult workers
whose jobs are crowded out by children’s participation in the labor market. One of
the major contributions of this paper is the formalization of the historically docu-
mented industrial opposition to the adoption of laws restricting children’s labor force
25participation. Capitalists oppose the adoption of a ban on child labor because such
a ban reduces opportunities for earning a high return on capital. Technical progress,
induced by skill accumulation, improves the earning prospects of ﬁrms hiring adult
workers only, while it reduces those of ﬁrms hiring children only. As a result, more
capitalists are drawn into the adult labor market, and industrial opposition to a ban
on child labor eventually vanishes over time. My model therefore emphasizes endoge-
nous demand to child labor, a feature that is missing in existing dynamic models of
child labor, despite abundant empirical evidence supporting it (e.g., Nardinelli 1988,
Galbi 1997, and Moehling 1999). To study the determinants of the emergence of laws
banning child labor, I restricted the analysis to the steady state, which was shown to
be unique, depending on the characteristics of the economy considered. Economies
where child labor exhibits skill-enhancing learning-by-doing converge to a steady state
with a positive proportion of skill workers, while those where child labor entails no
learning-by-doing converge to a poverty trap with no skill workers. A suﬃcient con-
dition for child labor laws to emerge in the steady state is that child labor exhibits
skill-enhancing learning-by-doing. Historical evidence supporting this condition is
found in Galbi (1997). Where this condition is not met, the analysis suggests that
appropriately targeted poverty alleviation mechanisms need to be designed in order
to induce unskilled parents to allocate a positive fraction of child’s time to schooling.
Education reforms that raise the quality of education and political reforms that raise
the cost of lobbying legislators against adoption of laws banning child labor can speed
26up the emergence of such laws.
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